Distributed best response dynamics for Nash equilibrium seeking in potential games
Shijie HUANG1
Peng YI2
1.Key Lab of Systems and Control, Academy of Mathematics and Systems Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China;School of Mathematical Sciences, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100190, China2.Department of Control Science & Engineering, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China;Shanghai Institute of Intelligent Science and Technology, Tongji University, Shanghai 201804, China
摘要：In this paper,we consider distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking in potential games over a multi-agent network,where each agent can not observe the actions of all its rivals.Based on the best response dynamics,we design a distributed NE seeking algorithm by incorporating the non-smooth finite-time average tracking dynamics,where each agent only needs to know its own action and exchange information with its neighbours through a communication graph.We give a sufficient condition for the Lipschitz continuity of the best response mapping for potential games,and then prove the convergence of the proposed algorithm based on the Lyapunov theory.Numerical simulations are given to verify the result and illustrate the effectiveness of the algorithm.
机标关键词：
论文发表日期：2020-08-05
在线出版日期：2025-08-15（本平台首次上网日期，不代表文献的发表时间）
页数：9( 324-332 )
英文信息